In the television show Deal or No Deal a contestant is endowed with a sealed box containing a monetary prize between one cent and half a million euros. In the course of the show the contestant is offered to exchange her box for another sealed box with the same distribution of possible monetary prizes inside. This offers a unique natural experiment for studying endowment effects under high monetary incentives. We find only weak endowment effects when contestants exchange their box for another box with the same distribution of possible prizes. (1980)) says that when people come to own a good, they tend to value it more than they did before they owned it ). For example, Kahneman et al. (1990) find that students, who were given mugs worth $6 each, were willing to sell them at a median price of $7 each. At the same time, students, who did not come to possess the mugs, were willing to buy them at a median price of $3.50 per mug. While many experiments replicate this result, several studies treat the endowment effect as an inexperienced consumer's mistake, which disappears in the process of learning (e.g. Knez et al. (1985) , Coursey et al. (1987) , Brookshire and Coursey (1987) , Shogren et al. (1994) .
Endowment Effects? "Even" with Half a Million on the Table! 1. Introduction
Substantial experimental evidence from economics and psychology suggests that initial endowments have an impact on human preferences. Endowment effect (Thaler (1980) ) says that when people come to own a good, they tend to value it more than they did before they owned it ). For example, Kahneman et al. (1990) find that students, who were given mugs worth $6 each, were willing to sell them at a median price of $7 each. At the same time, students, who did not come to possess the mugs, were willing to buy them at a median price of $3.50 per mug. While many experiments replicate this result, several studies treat the endowment effect as an inexperienced consumer's mistake, which disappears in the process of learning (e.g. Knez et al. (1985) , Coursey et al. (1987) , Brookshire and Coursey (1987) , Shogren et al. (1994) .
In a field experiment, List (2004) finds that professional dealers on the sports card market are more likely to accept the swap offer than inexperienced consumers. List (2004) argues that consumers facing decision problem, which they have experienced before, may overcome the endowment effect. In a similar vein, Myagkov and Plott (1997) find that risk-seeking behavior over losses, predicted by prospect theory, tends to decrease with experience in a market setting. Plott and Zeiler (2007) show that asymmetries in exchange behavior disappear if an experimenter controls for subject misconceptions by introducing incentive-compatible elicitation device, subject training in the task, paid practice rounds and subject anonymity. This paper contributes to this literature by showing that individuals exhibit only weak endowment effects if they make decisions involving high stakes, even without prior practice or training and when their decisions are broadcasted on television. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes television
show Deal or No Deal. Data are presented in Section 3. Section 4 derives the theoretical predictions of expected utility, regret and prospect theory. Section 5 presents our main empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
1 In addition to exchange offers, contestants also receive monetary offers for selling the content of their box. The second stage is the game itself. During the game, a contestant keeps her own box and opens the remaining boxes one by one. When a box is opened, the prize hidden inside is publicly revealed and eliminated from the list of possible prizes.
Description of the Television Show
After opening several boxes a contestant receives an offer from the "bank". The offer could be either a monetary price for the content of her box or the possibility to exchange her box for any of the remaining sealed boxes. If a contestant is offered to swap her box, she can pick any box from sealed boxes that are left in the game (the new box is not selected by the producers, the audience or other contestants). In this paper we analyze contestants' decisions whether to accept or reject the exchange offer.
The game terminates when either the contestant accepts the price offered by the "bank" or when all boxes are opened. In the latter case, the contestant leaves with the content of her box, which is opened last. The game does not terminate when the contestant accepts (or rejects) the exchange offer. Irrespective of the contestant's decision on the exchange offer, she must continue opening remaining sealed boxes one by one until the "bank" makes another offer or all boxes are opened. Figure 1 . For entertainment purposes, three low monetary prizes are substituted by token gifts (e.g. a cup for €5 or a puppy for €100). Boxes are assigned to the contestants by an independent adjudicator, who is present in the studio during the show.
French Version
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] During the preliminary stage, contestants receive one general knowledge selection question with three possible answers (A, B and C). One of contestants, who answered this question correctly, is selected to play the game. However, the criteria for the selection procedure (e.g. "fastest finger", random selection, longest waiting time on the show) are not revealed to the public.
In the French version of Deal or No Deal one of the prizes is a "Joker" -an episode-specific variable. The "Joker" is determined in the beginning of the show by multiplying the number of correct answers to the selection question, given by contestants in the preliminary stage, by €10,000. The amount of the "Joker" is instantaneously added to the list of possible prizes.
3
In the French version of the show contestants receive offers from the "bank" after opening 6, 3, 3, 3, 3 and 2 boxes respectively. Another peculiarity of this version is that the exchange offers are fairly frequent (up to four exchange offers per episode). However, there is no requirement for the "bank" to make any exchange offers to the contestant during a television episode.
Italian Version
Affari Tuoi is a daily television show, broadcasted on the first channel of Italian television RAI Uno. Twenty contestants participate in every episode. Every contestant is randomly assigned one box that contains one of twenty monetary prizes ranging from €0.01 to €500,000 ( [ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] In every episode, the contestant receives at least one offer to exchange her box.
Official rules of the show require the "bank" to offer exchange option at least once in every television episode. Therefore, the first offer that the "bank" makes to the contestant is always the exchange offer. 4 Since the "bank" always proposes exchange in the first offer, irrespective of the distribution of the remaining prizes or the personality of the contestant, the first exchange offer is always uninformative i.e. it does not provide any information about possible content of the contestant's box.
5
Occasionally (in 28% of all episodes in our sample), the contestant also receives the second offer to exchange her box. The "bank" typically offers the second exchange opportunity when there are only two sealed boxes left (including the box in the possession of the contestant). 6 The second exchange offer is made at the discretion of the "bank"
(official rules of the show do not regulate when the "bank" should offer second exchange possibility). However, in our recorded sample the "bank" offers the second exchange option almost equally frequently when the prize inside the contestant's box is above and below the median of the distribution of possible prizes. Thus, the second exchange offer is uninformative i.e. contestants cannot infer new information about the prize hidden inside their box upon observing the second exchange offer. from £0.01 to £250,000 ( Figure 3 ). 8 They are randomly assigned to 22 boxes by an independent adjudicator. However, an independent adjudicator does not assign boxes to contestants. After the prizes are distributed across boxes and boxes are sealed, contestants choose their boxes at random by drawing numbered ping-pong balls.
British Version
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] The British version of the show does not have a selection phase. The contestant is pre-selected by the producers and, therefore, it is quite rare for contestants to wait for more than 30 shows before they receive an opportunity to play the game. However, waiting contestants do not know in advance when they will be selected.
The game itself follows a similar procedure as in France and Italy: contestants receive offers after opening 5, 3, 3, 3, 3, and 3 boxes respectively. However, there are three major differences. First, the contestants in Deal or No Deal UK rarely receive exchange offers. As a rule, the "bank" offers to exchange the box when there are only two unopened boxed left and the contestant rejects the last monetary offer. 
Data
The data set, analyzed in this paper, consists of 49 television episodes of the 
Theoretical Prediction
Expected utility theory and many generalized non-expected utility theories such as, for example, regret theory predict that an individual is exactly indifferent between keeping her own box and exchanging it for any of the remaining identical sealed boxes.
However, (cumulative) prospect theory predicts that an individual should always reject the exchange offer due to the assumption of loss aversion. First, we will derive these theoretical predictions for a static decision problem when contestants evaluate a risky lottery as a lottery that delivers each of the possible prizes (that have not yet been eliminated from the game) with equal probability. Then we will consider a dynamic case, when contestants evaluate a risky lottery taking into account the expectation of future "bank" offers that they will receive in the course of the game.
Static Decision Problem

Expected Utility Theory
According to expected utility theory, an individual should be exactly indifferent between keeping her box and exchanging it for any of the remaining sealed boxes.
Consider a contestant who is offered an exchange when there are N sealed boxes each containing one of the prizes . Thus, the contestant receives exactly the same expected utility after exchanging her box as after keeping her initial box. In other words, according to expected utility theory there is no reason why the contestant should accept or reject an offer to exchange her box for one of the remaining sealed boxes.
Regret Theory
Many generalized non-expected utility theories also predict that an individual is indifferent between accepting and rejecting swap offer. . Thus, according to regret theory a contestant is exactly indifferent between accepting and rejecting the exchange offer. The intuition behind this result is simple. A contestant who accepts the exchange offer experiences ex post regret when she discovers at the end of the show that her initial box contained a larger prize. However, a contestant who rejects the exchange offer experiences exactly the same ex post regret when she opens all boxes only to discover that her initial box contains a smaller prize than one of the boxes that she could have selected when the bank offered an exchange.
(Cumulative) Prospect Theory
In prospect theory, an individual derives utility from changes in her asset position relative to a reference point (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ). Prospect theory does not specify what constitutes a reference point in a particular decision problem. In this section we show that an individual should never exchange her own box for any of the remaining sealed boxes irrespective of the location of a reference point. This theoretical prediction is driven by the assumption of loss aversion.
A contestant who rejects the exchange offer and keeps her box derives zero utility since her asset position does not change (relative to any reference point). Now consider a contestant who accepts the exchange offer. Let w be her private wealth (excluding the content of her box) and let i
, denote a prize inside her box before exchange.
Let ( )
. v be the value function that measures utility from changes in wealth relative to a reference point. The value function is normalized so that ( ) 0 0 = v . Prospect theory assumes that individuals are loss averse so that the value function is steeper for losses than for gains i.e. ( ) ( ) Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ).
Although prospect theory does not specify the location of a reference point, it assumes that individuals incorporate their initial endowments into their reference point (e.g. Kahneman et al. (1991) , Tversky and Kahneman (1991) Notice that w r = is a special case corresponding to the original version of prospect 13 Notice that if a contestant swaps boxes due to her subjective belief that her initial box contains a low prize, she may be expected to open an old box immediately after exchange. Interestingly, 90% of contestants who accepted the exchange offer in the Italian version of Deal or No Deal, do not open their old box immediately after exchange. Contestants, who accepted the first exchange offer opened on average 5.6 boxes before they called their old box to be opened. This may suggest that Italian contestants developed a sense of ownership and incorporated the content of their initial endowment into their reference point. theory in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) where a reference point is assumed to be equal to a current asset position. A recently proposed model of Koszegi and Rabin (2006) corresponds to a special case when constant r equals to the private wealth of a contestant w plus her (unobservable) rational expectation of future earnings in Deal or No Deal. In the remainder of the paper we will assume that w r ≥ .
According to the cumulative prospect theory, a contestant who exchanges her own box with prize i x for a box with a lower prize j x , Previous experimental studies demonstrate that the probability weighting function typically has a similar shape for gains and losses but it is more curved for gains and more linear for losses (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , Abdellaoui (2000) ). We will assume that there exist i.e. the contestant derives a strictly negative utility from exchanging her box for one of the remaining sealed boxes. In other words, according to prospect theory an individual has a strong reason not to exchange her box: the value of exchange is strictly negative because a loss averse individual expects more aggravation from losses than the pleasure from gains of the same amount.
Dynamic Decision Problem
In a dynamic decision problem, contestants take into account future "bank" offers that they are likely to receive in course of the game. A contestant facing prizes 1 x and 2 x hidden in two unopened boxes perceives them as a risky lottery ( ) is then recursively defined by . Utility from accepting the exchange offer (conditional on the prize j x being inside the new box) is then given by Bellman equation
Expected Utility Theory
Since the contestant does not know which prize is sealed inside her new box and prizes are distributed across boxes at random, expected utility after accepting exchange is given by
x , where conditional expected utility
is defined in (5). and expected utility after accepting exchange offer can be re-written as (4). Thus, in a dynamic decision problem expected utility maximizer gets the same utility from accepting and from rejecting exchange offer.
(Cumulative) Prospect Theory
In a dynamic decision problem, similarly to a static decision problem, contestants obtain zero utility from rejecting the exchange offer because their asset position does not change relative to any reference point that they may adopt. Next we show that contestants receive a strictly negative utility from accepting the exchange offer. If there are only two unopened boxes left with prizes 1 x and 2 x sealed inside, a contestant, who accepts the exchange offer, derives utility ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )<
with the first (strict) inequality due to the assumption of loss aversion.
If there are 2 > N unopened boxes left, a contestant faces a lottery recursively defined by (3). Notice that we cannot write Bellman equation (4) because (cumulative) prospect theory does not satisfy the independence axiom of expected utility theory. Let
...; , 1 1 denote the reduced form of a compound lottery, which is recursively defined in (3). According to (cumulative) prospect theory, utility of this lottery is given by
If prizes are distributed across boxes at random and contestants' expectation of future monetary offers depends only on the set of possible prizes, 16 every positive change in wealth during the swap is equally likely as a negative change in wealth of the same absolute amount (relative to the same reference point). Following the derivation presented in section 4.1.3 we can easily show that 0 < U due to the assumption of loss aversion. Tables 2 and 3 Contestants who accept at least one exchange offer do not reveal endowment effects.
Results
Contestants who rejected all swap offers do not necessarily exhibit an endowment effect.
Thus, contestants, who accept the first (or the only) exchange offer, and contestants, who reject the first offer but accept the second offer, are not averse to losses. 73% of French contestants, 47% of Italian contestants and 43% of British contestants, who receive the exchange offer in our data set, clearly reveal no endowment effect. Table 5 . Table 5 shows that exchange decisions do not depend on the distribution of possible monetary prizes that contestants face when the "bank" offers a swap opportunity.
Contestants, who eliminated large prizes, do not appear to be significantly more likely to accept or reject the exchange offer compared to contestants, who eliminated small prizes.
Similarly, contestants' decision to accept the exchange offer is apparently not affected by expected value, median or standard deviation of prizes that are left in unopened boxes. 
Conclusion
Television show Deal or No Deal offers a unique opportunity to study individual decision making under risk using lotteries with outcomes as high as half a million euros.
Perhaps for the first time since the famous thought experiment of Maurice Allais, we can investigate choice between large-stake lotteries with real incentives and real people.
Contestants from various regions of France, Italy and United Kingdom are widely dispersed in terms of age and occupation, which makes them a more diversified subject pool compared to the undergraduate students in the conventional laboratory experiments. Exchange decisions are not correlated with lottery-specific variables such as the expected value of possible prizes. Contestants, who eliminated large prizes from the list of possible prizes, do not appear to be more likely to accept or reject the exchange offer.
Deal or No Deal
We also find that exchange decisions are not correlated with individual-specific variables, with the exception of Italian female and older contestants, who are marginally less likely to accept the exchange offer. Thus, if there are individual differences in the strength of endowment effects, they appear to be largely an unobserved heterogeneity.
In traditional laboratory studies of endowment effects (e.g. Plott and Zeiler (2007) , List(2004) , Knetsch (1989) ) subjects are endowed with physical goods of a similar value.
In contrast, Deal or No Deal contestants receive uncertain endowments. The use of risky lotteries as the objects of exchange is a promising avenue for studying endowment effects when stakes are as high as half a million Euros. Commodities that have similar high value (e.g. real estate properties, Monet paintings from the same series etc.) are never exactly identical with many small inconsequential differences (e.g. a view from the window).
An experimenter can hardly control for such differences that may be just sufficient for inducing a strict preference for one of the objects. However, an experimenter can always construct identical risky lotteries over cash prizes or physical goods. Laboratory studies show that the effects of loss aversion are just as strong in choice under risk as they are in a riskless choice (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) ). Thus, the research on the loss aversion and the endowment effect can benefit from further laboratory experiments on the exchange asymmetries when the objects of exchange are identical risky lotteries.
If contestants incorporate the (initially unknown) content of the box that they select for themselves at the beginning of the show into their reference point, loss aversion predicts that contestants should always reject a swap offer. This is a stronger implication of loss aversion than in the mug-candy bar exchange experiments (Knetsch and Sinden (1984) , Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) and Knetsch (1989) ). In these experiments loss aversion implies that the fraction of individuals, who are not willing to exchange a mug (candy bar) for a candy bar (mug), should be higher in the treatment where subjects were initially endowed with a mug (candy bar) compared to the fraction of subjects in the baseline treatment, who were endowed with nothing and subsequently choose a mug (candy bar). Such control treatment is not required in our natural experiment because two objects that may be exchanged yield identical distributions of cash prizes. 
